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SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE METHOD OF
CASE DISPOSITION: DECISION-MAKING
BY PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN LOS ANGELES
LYNN M. MATHER Dartmouth College
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article is a revised version of a paper,
"To Plead Guilty or Go To Trial?" presented at the 1972 annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association. I wish to
thank Martin Shapiro, Laura Nader and Nelson Kasfir for their
helpful comments, and the attorneys, judges and court staff in
Los Angeles for their cooperation and assistance.
INTRODUCTION
Only a small fraction of the criminal cases in the United States
are decided by adversary trial processes. The vast majority are
settled by guilty pleas; many of these pleas occur after some
form of plea bargaining -either explicit negotiations over the
entry of a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced charge or a lenient
sentence, or tacit bargaining, as when the defendant pleads guilty
in anticipation of lenient sentencing. The most frequently cited
reason for plea bargaining is administrative expediency or "its
utility in disposing of large numbers of cases in a quick and
simple way" (Enker, 1967: 112). While caseload pressures are
doubtlessly important, they may be overemphasized in the cur-
rent literature.1 Frequently both the prosecutor and the defend-
ant want to avoid a full jury trial because of the risk and uncer-
tainty involved. The prosecutor is under administrative and/or
political pressure not to lose his case; a negotiated plea of guilty,
even if on a reduced charge, is a sure conviction, while conviction
by trial is never certain. The defendant's risk at trial is that his
sentence on conviction may be much stiffer than if he had pleaded
guilty.
That defendants are concerned with minimizing their possible
punishment points to a crucial aspect of the disposition process:
the importance of sentencing. The adversary trial proceeding is
designed to resolve the conflict over guilt or innocence. In prac-
tice, however, it is not the issue of guilt which is disputed in most
criminal cases, but it is the issue of sentencing (Barrett, 1967;
Mileski, 1971). Barrett (1967: 29) notes that police and prosecutors
screen out a large proportion of doubtful cases at early stages, so
that:
Most of the cases left to be dealt with. by the system then are
those in which there is no serious dispute over the guilt or in-
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nocence of the defendant. This fact sets the tone for the pro-
ces - .... Everyone concerned-the defense lawyer, the prosecut-
or, the judge, the probation officer-becomes aware of the fact
that he is involved in a process where the primary focus is on
deciding what to do with people who are in fact guilty. In that
context one cannot expect the system to conform to the conven-
tional adversary model.
Plea bargaining, unlike trial, does focus on the issue of what to do
with an offender - particularly in deciding how much leniency
will be given in return for a plea of guilty. Decisions on disposi-
tion "do not call for the yes-or-no answers of guilt or innocence.
They seek to predict the offender's future behavior and the im-
pact on the community of what is done to him" (Rosett, 1967: 76).
Plea bargaining facilitates compromise decisions by allowing the
use of mitigating information on the nature of the crime and the
defendant. This information, which may be relevant to sentenc-
ing, is difficult to introduce at trial because of standards of "rele-
vance" of evidence.
The relationship between sentencing and plea bargaining was
suggested over 40 years ago by writers concerned with the com-
promise of criminal cases. Moley (1929: 187-88) wrote:
The whole tendency [to ccmpromise cases] represents a drift
in the direction of individualizing the treatment of offenders.
What actually should happen in all criminal cases is an attempt
to adjust treatment to the needs of the individual case though
statutory penalties make this difficult. Yet such individualization
is at the heart of most forward-looking reforms of recent times,
particularly probation.2
While the majority of cases are settled by a plea bargaining
process, some criminal cases are still decided by adversary trial.
This paper addresses itself to the question: what determines
whether a case will be settled by plea bargaining or trial? In some
ways, this study is following a recommendation made in 1927 to
study "the types of cases in which compromises are most frequent
and the reasons for such compromises" (Miller, 1927: 29). It has
been suggested that the trial proceeding represents the failure of
attempts to settle the case by bargaining (Jacob, 1965; Skolnick,
1967). This paper also asks: To what extent is this true? What
determines the success or failure of plea bargaining. Focusing on
the relationship between plea bargaining and trial may lead to a
better understanding of the use and functions of each.
The defense attorney plays a key role in the defendant's
decision to plead guilty or not guilty, and different considerations
may be involved for private attorneys and Public Defenders
(Sudnow, 1965; but see Skolnick, 1967, for a contrary view). This
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paper will be limited to the decision-making of Public Defenders
in their handling of cases for plea or trial resolution. The research
reported here is from a study of felony disposition processes in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Central District).
The methodological approach of this study comes from
ethnography. Ethnography "seeks to account for the behaviQr of
a people by describing the socially acquired and shared knowl-
edge, or culture, that enables members of the society to behave in
ways deemed appropriate by their fellows" (Frake, 1969: 123).
This study, then, attempts to describe the behavior involved in
settling criminal cases and to account for this behavior by describ-
ing aspects of the court culture. Field work conducted in 1970-71
included interviews with attorneys, judges and court staff, analy-
sis of case files, some statistical analysis, and five months of ob-
servation in court. Contrary to my original research plans, I had
virtually no contact with defendants. Although defendants pro-
vide the reason for the court's existence, they do not share
directly in the culture of the court.
3
The Los Angeles Superior Court is the largest single trial
court in the nation, serving a population of over 7 million in the
County of Los Angeles; the court handles over one-half of the
felony cases in California. Processes of case disposition vary con-
siderably from one criminal court to another, so before presenting
my data on Los Angeles, I will briefly discuss recent descriptive
studies of urban courts. Three patterns of felony case disposition
can be distinguished: guilty plea with prosecutor dominant;
guilty plea with judge dominant; and not guilty plea with short-_
ened trial.
4
The first pattern is the conventional image of criminal courts
where a very high proportion of cases are disposed of by pleas
of guilty-perhaps 80-95% of the convictions are by pleas.
And, further, the prosecutor's office dominates the proceedings
by its initial screening and its explicit negotiations with defend-
ants and their attorneys. The negotiations may concern the charge
or the sentence; in either case, the court tends to approve rout-
inely the bargains agreed to by the - prosecutor. This pattern
Z Aiaracterizes plea bargaining in Detroit (President's Commission,
1967: Appendix B; McIntyre and Lippman, 1970), Houston (Fert-
itta, 1969; Busch, 1969; McIntyre and Lippman, 1970), Washington,
D.C. (Subin, 1966,_much of Michigan and Kansas (Newman,
1966), and "Metropolitan Court" 5 (Blumberg, 1967). ' -: •
The second pattern shows an equally high proportion of guilty
plea convictions but here judges rather than prosecutors tend to
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control the dispositional process. For instance, in Brooklyn (Tram-
mell, 1969; Meglio, 1969; McIntyre and Lippman, 1970) and Chicago
(Oaks and Lehman, 1968; McIntyre, 1968; McIntyre and Lippman,
1970) police file felony complaints directly into the lower court
system without prosecutorial screening. Lower court judges then
dispose of the majority of complaints either by dismissal or reduc-
tion to a misdemeanor charge. At the trial court level in Brooklyn,
judges participate in the plea negotiations at a mandatory pretrial
conference in open court. In Chicago's trial court, there is some
explicit negotiation between prosecutor and defense counsel, but
there are also informal discussions with the judge over the likely
sentence if the defendant were to plead guilty. Data for Minnea-
polis (Levin, 1970; 1971) and for many areas of Wisconsin (New-
man, 1966) show a variation on this pattern; although these courts
also have a high percentage of convictions by guilty plea, explicit
plea bargaining is infrequent. Instead, tacit bargaining occurs,
whereby defendants are encouraged to plead guilty by the known
tendency of judges to penalize with more severe sentences defend-
ants who plead not guilty.
Finally, some courts do not fit either of the above patterns
because the majority of defendants plead not guilty. Most are
then convicted by an abbreviated form of trial before a judge,
without jury. This third pattern of case disposition characterizes
Pittsburgh (Alschuler, 1968; Levin, 1970; 1971), Philadelphia
(Alschuler, 1968; White, 1971), Baltimore (President's Commis-
sion, 1967: Appendix B; Fertitta, 1969; Busch, 1969; McIntyre and
Lippman, 1970) and Los Angeles (UCLA Law Review, 1968; Meg-
lio, 1969; Trammell, 19 ntyre and Lippman, 1970; Green-
wood, et al.,0 1973). Because of the frequency of trials, the judge's
role is quite important, but the prosecutor's office may still exer-
cise significant influence. In Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, many
of the not guilty pleas are "slow pleas"7 (of guilty) with a brief
informal trial where the defense presents material to influence
the judge for leniency in sentencing. In Baltimore there are a
massive number of court trials- about 80% of the felony defend-
ants plead not guilty.Just over one-half of the defendants in Los> >..
Angeles plead not guilty; many then submit their cases to the
court (without jury) on the basis of the transcript of the preli-!
minary hearing-a procedure which often operates as a "slow!
plea" of guilty.
The next section of this paper presents an overview of felony
dispositions in Los Angeles. This includes a general description of
the court, the pre-trial screening process, the sentencing patterns,
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and the methods of disposition. The two sections following pres-
ent the ethnographic data on case disposition. The final section
pulls together factors determining the method of case disposition
and offers some corroborating statistical data.
OVERVIEW OF FELONY DISPOSITIONS IN LOS ANGELES
Description of the Court
In 1970 there were 31,571 felony defendants8 disposed of in Los
Angeles Superior Court (Bureau of Criminal Statistics-hereafter
B.C.S., 1970: 12). A large staff of attorneys was employed to handle
this enormous caseload. The District Attorney's office had ap-
proximately 430 lawyers; there were about 350 lawyers in the
Public Defender's office. In both offices appointments and promo-
tions were made on the basis of a civil service merit system. The
majority of defendants in Superior Court - an estimated 60%
in 1970- were represented by attorneys in the Public Defender's
office.9
The most common offense charged was a violation of the drug
laws, for which 44% of the defendants were prosecuted; 90% of
those cases involved marijuana or dangerous drugs ("pill cases").
The second most common offense was burglary, which was
charged against 15% of the defendants. (See Table II in the Ap-
pendix for further data on offenses.) One-half of the defendants
were under 25 years of age. Although Mexican-Americans and
blacks comprised about 25% of the population of the county, they
appeared as almost one-half of the defendants. In terms of prior
criminal record, 56% of the defendants had none or only a minor
record, while 14% had a prior prison record1 ° (B.C.S., 1970: 22-28).
The Los Angeles Superior Court is divided into eight districts,
the largest being- the Central district, located in downtown Los
Angeles. The Central district was the research site for this study.
About 40% of the cases in the county were handled in the Central
district. The Public Defender represented about 70% of the de-
fendants in the Central district, a higher figure than for the
entire county.
Within the Central district, all defendants were arraigned in
the Master Calendar Department. Most defendants pleaded not
guilty at this arraignment and the Presiding Judge assigned each
a date and courtroom for trial.1 There were 26 trial departments.
Associated with each one was a judge, 2 or 3 deputy District
Attorneys (hereafter D.A.'s), a clerk, reporter and bailiff. Also,,
several deputy Public Defenders (hereafter P.D.'s) usually had
settings for cases in the same courtroom. Needless to say, this
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daily interaction of participants in each courtroom led to certain
mutual expectations and predictions about bargaining behavior
and sentencing behavior.
Pre-Trial Screening of Cases
After a defendant has been arrested on a felony charge, and
police have investigated his case, the D.A.'s office decides whether
or not to prosecute. The D.A. may decide to file a complaint for
felony prosecution, refer the case to the City Attorney for mis-
demeanor prosecution, or reject the case completely. In Los
Angeles, prosecutors exercise considerable discretion at this point,
filing felony complaints on only about one-half of the felony
arrests (Klein, 1957; (Southern California Law Review, 1969;
Greenwood, et al., 1973). If a felony complaint is filed, the next
screening occurs at the preliminary hearing.
At the preliminary hearing (held about two weeks later),
the Municipal Court judge decides whether there is reasonable or
probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of the of-
fense charged. About 15-20% of the cases are terminated prior to
Superior Court prosecution. While most of these are dismissed,
some may be prosecuted further-as felonies (the D.A. may refile
the complaint), as misdemeanors, or as cases in juvenile court or in
other jurisdictions 12 (Graham and Letwin, 1969; Greenwood, et al.,
1973). The Grand Jury is used infrequently in Los Angeles; 99%
of defendants are formally charged by the filing of an information
in Superior Court (B.C.S., 1970: 10).
Approximately two weeks after the preliminary hearing, the
defendant appears in the Master Calendar Department of Superior
Court to be arraigned and to enter his plea. As there may be a
hundred defendants in this court on a given day, neither the pros-
ecutors nor the defense attorneys, have time for much discussion
or plea negotiation at this stage. About three percent of the de-
fendants plead guilty at the arraignment (Greenwood, et al., 1973:
104). The rest plead not guilty and are assigned a date and court-
room for trial (the trial date is usually seven or eight weeks
away)."
Once a case is sent to its trial department, investigation and
planning for final disposition may begin, as the case is now in
the hands of the P.D. and D.A. who will be responsible for trying
it. Prior to this point, different P.D.'s had represented the defend-
ant at the preliminary hearing in Municipal Court and at the
arraignment and plea in Superior Court. Likewise, different
D.A.'s had filed the complaint and prosecuted the case at each of
the subsequent proceedings.
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Upon first evaluating a case, a P.D. in trials will determine
whether there are any constitutional issues of search and seizure
involved; if so, he will seek a dismissal in a separate hearing, on
a motion of §1538.5 of the Penal Code to suppress evidence which
may have been illegally obtained. Another pretrial motion fre-
quently raised by defense is based upon §995 of the Penal Code,
seeking to quash the information because of insufficient evidence.
These pretrial hearings are fairly common, occurring in an esti-
mated 20% of the cases. They are generally independent of any
plea iegotiations and are quite adversarial in nature.
- In summary, by the time a case has reached its trial date, it
has survived extensive prosecutorial screening, some additional
screening at the preliminary hearing, and many of the evidentiary
and procedural issues have been resolved.
The next section will discuss aspects of the sentencing process.
Normally, discussion of sentencing is presented after a discussion
of disposition, rather than before. However, the disposition pro-
cess only becomes understandable when it is viewed in the con-
text of the anticipation of punishment. It is after consideration of
the sentencing possibilities that strategies of plea negotiation are
developed and the decision to plead or go to trial is made.
Sentencing
All of the cases in court, by their definition as felonies, are
punishable by at least one year in state prison. By California's
indeterminate sentencing laws, the actual length of a prison term
is determined (within a range set by law) by the Adult Authority,
not by the trial judge. However, of 25,642 felony defendants con-
victed in 1970, only 6% were sentenced to state prison, 70% re-
ceived probation (some with jail time), 15% received county jail
seritences, and 9% received other commitments such as California
Youth AiiH-hify,--fine, California Rehabilitation Center, or De-
partment of Mental Hygiene (B.C.S., 1970: 5).
The P.D.'s know this pattern of sentencing, and they also
know how different kinds of cases are likely to fit into this pat-
tern. Two key factors in the sentencing decision are the defend-
ant's prior record and the type ofoffe nse.-Defendants without
criminal records can anticipate leniency from the court. For ex-
ample, almost 90% of convicted defendants in 1970 with minor or
no prior records received probation or a fine, compared with
about 55% of defendants with major or prior prison records. And
further, only 8% of defendants with no record were sentenced to
county jail or prison compared with 50% of defendants with prior
prison records (B.C.S.,n.d.).
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Penalties for different offenses are prescribed by law, but
actual sentencing decisions reflect, in addition, the judges' views
on the severity of different crimes. Cases are perceived according
to categories of "normal crime" -categories of offense types
based upon knowledge of typical patterns in committing such
offenses and the characteristics of the typical offender associated
with that crime (Sudnow, 1965). Thus, some crimes which may be
considered serious by the state legislature, are not so viewed by
the court, because these offenses do not typically display danger-
ous or professional criminal activity - for example, bookmaking,
homosexuality, marijuana, pills and other victimless crimes.
One judge explained:
Although the type of punishment legally defines a "felony," in
actual fact - because "felony" carries with it other implications
- an offense may be called a "felony" for reasons other than
punishment. For example, bookmaking. Now, that crime used to
be a city ordinance, a misdemeanor. But a police officer is only
allowed to arrest on a misdemeanor charge if he witnesses the
offense. But, of course, bookmaking goes on behind closed doors,
so the officers weren't able to sustain their charges.
When bookmaking is made a felony, then the cops can come
in and charge for an offense which they didn't witness. Book-
making always gets a misdemeanor sentence though. Another
example of this is these pill cases. They were made felonies just
a few years ago. It was a clear example of the Legislature panick-
ing. The Legislature thinks that the answer to all crime is to
simply increase the punishment. Now that's absurd. Punishment
is not going to solve the problem of pills. I've never seen one pill
case go to the state prison. (Emphasis added)
Much of the information for the sentencing decision comes
from the "probation report" which is prepared by an officer of
the probation department. The report includes a summary of the
defendant's record, background, and the circumstances of the
offense, along with a recommendation on the advisability of pro-
V- bation. Most judges tend to follow these recommendations and,
to the extent that they do not, it is usually the judges who are
more lenient than the probation officers (often as a result of a
plea bargain).
Disposition Alternatives
There are several possibilities for the final disposition of a
case: (1) The defendant changes his plea from not guilty to guilty.
The guilty plea may be to the offense as .charged, to a lesser of-
fense, or to one of several offenses charged against him. The plea
may be entered with a tacit understanding of the likely sentence
or with an informal indication by the judge as to the probable
sentence. Or, the judge may formally promise to give a certain
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sentence on the condition that the probation report is favorable;
in the event of an unfavorable report, the defendant is allowed to
withdraw his plea. (2) The defendant has an abbreviated trial
(without jury) on the basis of the transcript of the preliminary
hearing and, if desired, with additional evidence and argument.
This method of trial, known as "submission on the transcript,"
often operates as a "slow plea" of guilty and then involves the
same kinds of bargains as to charge and sentence as in a guilty
plea. (3) The defendant has a full court trial (without jury). (4)
The defendant has a jury trial.(5) The case is dismissed after a
pretrial motion on the evidence or "in the interests of justice."
The frequency of these alternative dispositions is shown in
Table 1.14
TABLE 1: METHOD OF CASE DISPOSITION FOR ALL FELONY DEuND-
ANTS, SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1970.
(B.C T 70--12---
N % Disposition
15,013 47.6 Guilty plea
10,205 32.3 Trial by submission on
transcript
2,518 8.0 Court trial
1,141 3.6 Jury trial
2,694 8.5 Dismissal
31,571 100.0 Total
Submission on the transcript (S.O.T.) trials, while authorized
for all of California, rarely occur in counties other than Los
Angeles. Most S.O.T. proceedings substitute for guilty plea dis-
positions, often including discussion or bargaining beforehand.
For example, the judge may commit himself (formally or in-
formally) to what the likely sentence would be if the defendant
is found guilty; or there may be an agreement whereby the
defendant will be convicted of a lesser charge. The conviction
rate for S.O.T. trials was 81.0% in comparison to a conviction rate
of 69.8% for jury trials and 62.2% for court trials (B.C.S., 1970:
12). In some cases, the S.O.T. proceeding is used where the D.A.
would like to dismiss the case but feels he cannot justify it to his
superiors; so the case is submitted to the judge for acquittal. In
other cases, S.O.T. is a semi-adversary proceeding where the
defense concedes certain points in the case but wishes to con-
test others; thus, argument is focused only on the issues in con-
flict, not on the entire case. However, most S.O.T. trials are really
"slow pleas" of guilty, with the advantages that the defendant
reserves his right to appeal and does not have to admit guilt
(which is also a selling point for the defense attorney to his
client). Instead of referring to the choice between guilty plea and
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trial disposition, henceforth I shall distinguish between "trial"
and "non-trial," with "trial" referring only to the full adversary
proceedings of court or jury trial.
During the interval (roughly two months) between the de-
fendant's not guilty plea in the Master Calendar Department and
the date set for trial in a specific courtroom, the P.D. investigates
the case and may argue a pretrial motion. If, after talking with
his client, the P.D. thinks that a non-trial disposition would be
appropriate, he approaches theD-AT.witlh-gn offer. The attorneys
usually do not discuss possibilities for final disposition until just
before, or the morning of, the date set for trial, and it is custom-
ary for the defense attorney to approach the D.A. to suggest a
plea bargain. The suggested bargain is generally based on a real-
istic estimate of "what the case is worth," as well as "what is
available" according to D.A. office policies of charge reduction.
Certain reductions are routinely available, but for others the D.A.
must secure permission from his superiors before accepting a plea
to a lesser charge.
Of all defendants convicted in 1970, 9% were convicted of
misdemeanor charges, 18% convicted of lesser felonies, and 73%
convicted of felonies as charged. But while only 9% were convict-
ed misdemeanor charges, 59% of the defendants were convicted
at the misdemeanor level (B.C.S., 1970: 18). This is due to an inter-
esting use of §17 of the Penal Code-a section which defines the
level of conviction according to the sentence imposed. That is,
felonies in California are divided into "mandatory" felonies and
"optional" felonies. A mandatory felony is punishable only by
imprisonment in state prison (or death, in 1970), while an optional
felony is punishable by prison, county jail or fine.15 (For most
cases involving either type of felony, however, probation can be
imposed.) By §17 of the Penal Code, defendants who are convicted
of an optional felony charge may receive a misdemeanor level of
conviction if the judge imposes a misdemeanor-type sentence.
The D.A.'s are reluctant to accept pleas to misdemeanor charges,
preferring instead to arrange a disposition to an optional felony
and to leave the decision to the judge whether to make the con-
viction a misdemeanor by sentence. Charge reduction is most im-
portant in cases involving mandatory felony offenses, because the
court cannot give a misdemeanor sentence on a mandatory fel-
ony; a disposition to a lesser, optional felony leaves the choice
open as to whether a misdemeanor or a felony sentence will be
imposed.
Thus, a key question for a defense attorney seeking a non-
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trial disposition is how the judge will exercise his discretion in
sentencing. P.D.'s try to have their cases "disposed of" (settled
without trial) by judges whose sentencing behavior they can
fairly accurately predict, or by judges who will "chamberize,"
that is, who will indicate to defense counsel in chambers what the
likely sentence will be. If the judge to whom the case is assigned
for trial does not appear favorable to his client, the P.D. (with
the approval of the D.A.) can have the case transferred to a "short
cause" court. There are two short cause courts among the 26 trial
departments; they are designed to handle only guilty plea dis-
positions or S.O.T. trials which can be heard in less than one hour.
Judges who are known to be lenient sentencers are generally
assigned to the short cause departments, thus facilitating non-trial
dispositions.
After a P.D. has arranged a plea or S.O.T. disposition, he re-
turns to his client for the final decision on disposition. P.D.'s vary
as to how strongly they will advise their clients at this point.' 6
Likewise, defendants differ as to their willingness to accept a bar-
gained disposition or to insist on a trial. Some cases go to trial be-
cause of disagreement between the defendant and his attorney,
not because of disagreement between the P.D. and the D.A.17
After this brief overview of the disposition process, I return
to the question of how P.D.'s decide between non-trial and trial
disposition as the best procedure for resolving a case. Data for the
decision come from the P.D.'s investigation of the case: the defen-
dant's version of what happened, the arrest report made by po-
lice, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, interviews with
possible witnesses, examination of any physical evidence, and
any other pertinent information. All of this, plus the defendant's
background and prior criminal record, is evaluated in terms of
the chances of acquittal and the possibilities in sentencing. This
evaluation reflects a thorough knowledge of the outcomes of many
other cases and a familiarity with judge and jury behavior on
issues of reasonable doubt and judicial behavior on sentencing.
Two features of a case appear to be most important for the
P.D.'s decision on disposition strategy: the strength of the prose-
cution's case and the seriousness of the case, in terms of the likely
punishment on conviction. These features, in combination, yield a
typology of cases which is useful for analysis of dispositions. This
typology is developed below.
"Dead bang" cases are cases with very strong evidence against
the defendant and with no credible or consistent explanation by
the defendant for innocence. "Dead bang" is a term used by P.D.'s
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to indicate high chance of conviction; P.D.'s estimate that the
majority of their cases are "dead bang" cases. "Reasonable doubt"
cases, those with limited or conflicting evidence and some plau-
sible defense, are essentially of two kinds. In one type of "reason-
able doubt" case, the doubt centers on the degree of the defend-
ant's involvement in the crime or on the gravity of the offense so
that there is a chance of acquittal on the original charge, but still a
high chance of conviction on a lesser criminal charge. In the other
type of "reasonable doubt" case, the doubt arises from insufficient
evidence either to connect the defendant with the crime or to
prove that any crime has been committed; in these cases there
may be a good chance of complete acquittal.
The seriousness of a case refers to the probability of a severe
sentence on conviction. A "serious" case, then, is one with a high
chance of a state prison sentence. Either a bad criminal record
for a defendant or a severe offense (such as a mandatory felony)
identifies a case as "serious." All of the criteria used in sentencing,
such as the defendant's background (age, family, employment,
etc.) and the circumstances of the offense are relevant to the de-
termination of whether a case is "serious" or "light." "Light" cases
are those with no real possibility of a state prison sentence, and
a good chance of a sentence of probation.
The terms presented above, "dead bang" vs. "reasonable
doubt" and "serious" vs. "light" cases, are described each as di-
chotomous categories, but clearly strength and seriousness are
continuous. Some cases surely fall between the extremes. Never-
theless, these categories are often used by the P.D.'s as they talk
about their cases, and they are useful for explaining the processes
of case disposition. The next two sections illustrate how the cate-
gories of strength and seriousness interact to produce trial or non-
trial dispositions.
CASE DISPOSITION: THE "LIGHT" CASE
The "Dead Bang" Case
Conviction is very likely in these cases, because of the
strength of the prosecution's case, and since the cases are "light,"
there is no chance of a state prison sentence and a good chance of
probation. These cases are resolved by a non-trial disposition,
either a guilty plea or a trial by submission on the transcript.
'There is little explicit bargaining accompanying most of these
dispositions because specific outcomes are fairly predictable. It is
understood that the D.A. will get his conviction and the defen-
dant will get a lenient sentence and, further, both parties know
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the sentencing practices of the judge hearing the case (and of the
alternative judges in short cause) and the kinds of charge reduc-
tions and dismissals which are permitted according to D.A. office
policies. Thus, most case outcomes are arrived at routinely, with
minimal conflict between the P.D. and the D.A. A judge, quite
involved with committees studying court processes, commented:
There is a large universe of practices which, for lack of a better
word, I shall call "pre-plea discussions" regarding the outcome
of a case. A subset of these practices are the actual "plea bar-
gains." But pre-plea discussions encompass a much larger range
than plea bargaining, and are actually a more appropriate way of
talking about what goes on in court these days.
When asked by the author to describe some pre-plea discussions
which are not actual plea bargains, the judge continued:s
On a three count forgery case, the defense attorney asks the
D.A., "Can I have one count?" The D.A. says, "Yes, which one?"
The defense attorney says "Count 2." And that's it. No bargain
has been made. No promise made that counts 1 and 3 will be
dismissed in exchange for the plea to count 2. It's simply that
everyone knows what the standard practice is. Or here's another
example. The defense attorney comes into court and asks the
D.A., "What does Judge Hall give on bookmaking cases?" The
D.A. asks if there are any priors. The attorney says "no," and
the D.A. says, "He usually gives $150 fine on the first offense."
The attorney says, "Fine. We'll enter a plea to count one." Again
no promise was made by anybody. It's just that everyone knows
what customarily will happen. This is what I mean by the larger
arena of pre-plea discussions. (Emphasis added)
In another example, the defendant was charged with bur-
glary. On the morning of the trial date, the P.D. and D.A. spoke
briefly and agreed to transfer the case to a short cause depart-
ment. Since the defendant was in custody, the P.D. wanted to
waive the probation report (which would take an additional 3-4
weeks to prepare) and have the defendant sentenced immediately.
The P.D. was familiar with Judge Greene's sentencing practices
(the judge in short cause) and court was busy that afternoon, so
the attorneys did not discuss the case in chambers before dispo-
sition. When the judge called the case, the P.D. announced that
his client wished to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. Then
the D.A. "took the waivers," that is, he asked the defendant a
series of questions to ascertain that he understood the nature and
consequences of the proceedings, that he waived his rights to jury
trial, cross-examination of witnesses, and self-incrimination, and
that no promises or threats had been made to induce the plea of
guilty. Judge Greene then accepted thq plea, making it second
degree burglary, and the following occurred:
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P.D.: Your Honor, we request immediate sentencing and
waive the probation report.
Judge: What's his record?
P.D.: He has a prior drunk and a GTA (Grand Theft Auto).
Nothing serious. This is really just a shoplifting case.
He did enter the K-Mart with the intent to steal. But
really all we have here is a petty theft.
Judge: What do the people have?
D.A.: Nothing either way.
Judge: Any objections to immediate sentencing?
D.A.: No.
Judge: How long has he been in?
P.D.: 83 days.
Judge: I make this a misdemeanor by P.C. §17 and sentence you
to 90 days in County Jail, with credit for time served.
Interestingly, the P.D. refers to offenses in terms of their
social reality rather than their legal definitions. That is, legally
the case may be a burglary, but "really" it is just a petty theft.
Likewise, Grand Theft Auto may be a serious crime according to
the Penal Code, but because of the circumstances which typically
surround it, everyone knows it's usually "nothing serious." The
P.D.'s comments below to the author indicate some of the con-
siderations involved in formulating a disposition:
P.D.: I could have gotten a disposition of a plea to petty theft
(a straight misdemeanor). But knowing Greene, he'd
make it second degree (an optional felony) with a mis-
demeanor sentence.
L.M.M.: But why not plead to petty theft, instead of pleading to
the felony?
P.D.: Because petty theft can be counted as a prior.
L.M.M.: What do you mean?
P.D.: Petty theft with a prior petty theft or a prior felony
conviction is automatically a felony. So with a plea to a
felony but with a misdemeanor sentence, that makes
this burglary a misdemeanor. Thus, it could not be
counted as a prior for petty theft.
Now if the guy was completely clean and probably
never going to get into trouble again, then I'd want him
to plead to petty theft, because it looks better on his
record. But this kid's in the ghetto and caught up in that
and will probably get into trouble again. So it's better
for him if he doesn't have a petty theft prior.
Also, you consider the prosecutor. He wants a plea to a
felony because it makes their statistics look better. But
I know it doesn't really make much difference. Em-
ployers or the police go by a guy's rap sheet which
shows arrests. And after all, it stays as a felony arrest
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even if he would have pled to the misdemeanor. But
this way, the prosecutor thinks I'm giving him a break.
So maybe later he'll give me a break.
In plea discussions, P.D.'s bring out anything in the circum-
stances of the case or about the background of the defendant
which would justify a lenient disposition. P.D.'s refer to facts
which minimize the gravity of the offense ("nothing was taken"
in a burglary or "no one was hurt" in a robbery), which mitigate
the defendant's involvement ("the defendant was drunk at the
time"), or which point to the defendant's good character ("he's
enrolled full-time in school" or "he's supporting his sick moth-
er"). When the P.D. is particularly interested in charge reduction,
he also points out any contradictions or weak points in the prose-
cution's case.
The "Reasonable Doubt" Case
Where doubt in a case centers on the degree of the de-
fendant's involvement in a crime (that is, where the case for
the original charge is weak, but where there is strong evidence
for guilt on a lesser charge), the case is usually resolved by a
non-trial disposition to a lesser charge. This occurs frequently
in cases which P.D.'s consider were "overfiled" initially. Most
D.A.'s deny that their cases are overfiled, saying instead that
they are simply filed at the highest possible level permitted
by the evidence. There are certain routine charge reductions
which (as in the disposition of the "dead bang" case above)
generally require no negotiation to obtain. For example, a
suspect arrested driving a stolen car may be charged with Grand
Theft Auto and Felony Joyriding; he then usually pleads
guilty to the lesser count of Felony Joyriding. Or, a defendant
arrested with a large quantity of marijuana or dangerous drugs
is charged with Possession for Purposes of Sale (which carries
a much heavier sentence than simple Possession) and then is
convicted by plea or S.O.T. trial of simple Possession.
In the following example, the defendant (who was re-
leased on bail) was charged with burglary of an automobile
(an optional felony offense). The P.D. and D.A. discussed the
case in the judge's chambers for disposition to a lesser charge
based upon a crucial weakness in the prosecution's case:
P.D.: We'll submit it (S.O.T. trial). We'd like either an auto
tampering or a petty theft (both are straight misde-
meanors). He admits taking the Panasonic, but ....
Judge: (interrupting) Yeah, I've read this transcript. There's
no evidence that the car was locked. (Emphasis added.)
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After the discussion in chambers, the judge resumed the bench
and called the case. The P.D. announced that the case would
be submitted on the transcript, "with a maximum possible con-
viction of auto tampering, Vehicle Code §10852." The D.A. con-
curred and "took the waivers" from the defendant. In addition,
the defendant stipulated that "in all probability" he would be
found guilty. The case was a "straight submission" with no
additional argument or testimony and the defendant was found
guilty of auto tampering, a violation of Vehicle Code § 10852.
For cases which are weak and present reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of any offense, P.D.'s seek a complete
acquittal. If the weakness is apparent on the basis of the trans-
cript of the preliminary hearing, and if the P.D. thinks that the
D.A. handling the case will be receptive to the disposition, then
the P.D. discusses the case with him to arrange an acquittal. If the
D.A. agrees, he may talk to his superiors for permsission to dis-
miss the case, but usually he prefers to talk to the judge, agreeing
to an S.O.T. trial for a not guilty finding. For example, one P.D.
described a D.A. who was not intimidated by office pressures
against dismissing cases:
In Beal's court, the D.A. was good. He'd come into chambers and
tell the judge, "Lcok, I've got this case, and I think the cop is
lying, so I don't want to call him as a witness." And Judge Beal
would dismiss the case.
Another D.A. explained how he used the proceeding of S.O.T. for
a not guilty verdict:
If you've got an exceptional case - one which is weak and
there's a good chance that the defendant may be innocent - then
you don't want to take it before a jury because you never know
what they'll do. And besides you don't want to try it because
it's such a bad case. So you chamberize with the judge and agree
to S.O.T. with a not guilty verdict.... For example, where there
is direct evidence for the corpus of a crime but only indirect evi-
dence to link the defendant to the crime. That is, there could be
a completely innocent explanation of the defendant's connection
to the scene. If it's a weak case but I'm convinced he's guilty,
then I'll try it. But on a weak case where the defendant could
be innocent, I don't like to trust the vagaries of a jury. (Emphasis
added.)
P.D.'s do not consider the majority of D.A.'s to be as willing
to agree an acquittal as the D.A. quoted above. Thus, on most
weak cases with reasonable doubt on the defendant's guilt, the
P.D.'s would go directly for adversary trial disposition. Since the
cases discussed in this section are "light," there would be few or
no sentencing risks involved by a trial disposition, as the sentence
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even after trial would probably be quite lenient. Most P.D.'s
interviewed did not believe that defendants were sentenced more
severely after a trial conviction than if they had. been convicted
on a plea or S.O.T. disposition. This was particularly true where
the defendant had a clean record and the offense was considered
minor. As the defendant's record lengthened and the circum-
stances of the offense appeared more serious, trial might involve
some sentencing risks: the defendant could be assured of le-
niency in a non-trial disposition, but he would have to take his
chances on the probation report after conviction by trial. Never-
theless, these risks were usually not considered very great;
P.D.'s were more interested in securing a complete acquittal
than in securing a lenient sentence. In these cases, there was
usually no discussion or bargaining with the D.A. prior to dis-
position, and the P.D.'s took the cases directly to court or jury
trial.
CASE DISPOSITION: THE "SERIOUS" CASE
There is usually more conflict involved in the resolution
of "serious" cases than of "light" cases because both D.A.'s and
judges hesitate to exercise discretion in cases involving grave
offenses or defendants with bad records. In resolving a "light"
case, P.D.'s point out factors relating to the offense, the de-
fendant's background, and weakness in the prosecution's case
in order to arrange a non-trial disposition. But in "serious"
cases, there is more likely to be negotiation and bargaining
over these elements, and a non-trial disposition which is favor-
able to the defendant is much more difficult to obtain.
The "Dead Bang" Case
In these cases, where there is a good chance of conviction
and a possibility of state prison sentence, P.D.'s bargain to se-
cure a non-trial disposition with as lenient a sentence as pos-
sible (and, at the least, an indication of no state prison). Some
"serious" cases take little bargaining, as all parties soon con-
cede the mitigating factors involved; a plea or S.O.T. disposi-
tion is easily arranged in these as they are "not really state
prison cases." In other cases, the P.D. and D.A. may negotiate
for some time before agreeing on a disposition; or they may
fail to agree, in which case the P.D. will take the case to
adversary trial.
The following case illustrates a process of lengthy nego-
tiations and continuances in resolving a very "serious," very
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"dead bang" case. The defendant was charged with burglary;
he was in custody and had five prior burglary convictions.
There was evidence that he had been drinking just before his
arrest. The P.D. had continued the case once already and was
having difficulty reach a plea agreement with the D.A. (The
P.D. said that 90% of the time he and this D.A. agreed on
"appropriate dispositions," but in this case they did not.) The
P.D. described the case:
The guy was caught drilling a hole in the wall next to a safe in a
store. There's no defense at all. And he's got five prior burglary
convictions - and they're all good priors. I wanted to go to
Greene (a judge in short cause) and plead him. Maybe we
could keep him out of state prison then. In any other court it's
prison for sure. The guy's just an old drunk. But Davis (the
D.A.) wouldn't agree to going to Greene. And the D.A. has to
consent to short cause. He figured with five priors and drilling a
hole in the wall by the safe, that the guy's not just an old drunk.
That he's a professional burglar. I don't think so, though.
The difference of opinion on this case centered on an evalua-
tion of the defendant's character: that is, if he was "a pro-
fessional burglar" as the D.A. claimed, then he should go to
state prison; but if he was "just an old drunk" as his attorney
argued, county jail would be appropriate.
Because of calendar pressures later, the D.A. did consent
to transfer to short cause and there the defendant pleaded
guilty. The P.D. explained that he did not talk with the judge
about sentencing before his client pleaded guilty because,
We only chamberize where the D.A. and myself are in accord -
we've agreed on what we want and go into chambers to tell the
judge. But here in this case, there was a straight conflict between
the D.A. and myself. So there's no point in talking in chambers.'"
The probation report came back with a generally unfavorable
recommendation, as did an additional report from a 90-day
diagnostic study by the Department of Corrections, but the P.D.
argued strongly for lenient consideration. Finally, the judge
sentenced the defendant to one year in County Jail with no
credit for time served (about 9 months). The P.D. commented:
Two years County Jail is better than even six months of The
Joint (state prison) -especially since prison might have kept
him 5 to 10 years because of his record.
In "serious" cases where the P.D. can see no possibility of
avoiding a state prison sentence, he may resolve the case with-
out trial through some kind of bargain on the prison sentence.
If the defendant is charged with several severe offenses, he
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may plead to one and thus avoid the possibility of consecutive
sentences. Or, for example, if the defendant is charged with
first degree robbery with an allegation of Great Bodily Injury
(which carries a fifteen to life prison term), a deal might 'be
arranged where he could plead to second degree robbery (with
a prison term of one to life). However, there is conflicting
opinion among P.D.'s on the value of these kinds of "bargains,"
since judges tend to give concurrent rather than consecutive
sentences even on trial convictions of multiple charges. Besides,
the Adult Authority determines the final release date for de-
fendants in prison, and it may consider the original facts and
charges in the case, not just the charges to which the defendant
pleaded guilty.
Thus, for many cases where the P.D. cannot successfully
bargain for a non-state prison sentence, a trial disposition is
chosen. "The defendant's got nothing to lose- he'd go to The
Joint anyway," one judge commented:
If the defendant did what he did and he's going to prison for it
anyway - particularly if it's a heinous offense - then he's not
going to get any consideration from me or the probation depart-
ment. In that case, his lawyer will tell him that he can't do any-
thing for him, so he might as well go to trial and take his chances
on an acquittal. (Emphasis added.)
Typical cases which are likely to go to trial because (the judge
continued) "there is no room for negotiation" included:
Armed robbery - that gets five to life. Forcible rape. First degree
burglary with maybe some injuries involved. Murder cases,
Some child molestation cases.
The "Reasonable Doubt" Case
In "serious" cases where there is a possibility of acquittal
on the original charge (but likely conviction on a lesser charge)
or a possibility of a complete acquittal, the sentencing risks
involved in a trial disposition are high. Since "serious" cases
usually involve mandatory felonies and/or defendants with prior
felony conviction, the judge may be prevented by statute from
granting a misdemeanor sentence or probation if the defendant
is convicted as charged. But if he is convicted of a lesser charge,
or if the D.A. offers no evidence on the "priors" (as might occur
in a bargained disposition), the judge possesses the discretion
to grant a more lenient sentence, and he is usually more will-
ing to exercise this discretion for leniency. Most attorpieys in-
terviewed indicated that defendants who have been convicted
at trial are not sentenced more severely than they would have
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been had they been convicted in a non-trial disposition; 2' with
the qualification that, as one D.A. noted:
What often happens, though, is that by going to trial he (the de-
fendant) gets convicted of a lot more serious charge than if he
had taken a disposition to a lesser charge. Like we told them in,
that... case this morning: robbery conviction with a finding of
"armed" would mean state prison. In (non-trial) disposition, the
judge is saying the defendant will get something less for pleading
guilty. But if the case goes to trial, then the judge is no longer
bound by any earlier conditions.. . . A plea bargain may involve
a different charge than the charge at trial, that's why the sen-
tences would be different. (Emphasis added.)
If a P.D. feels that a case is "overfiled," (that is, that there
is a good chance of conviction on a lesser charge but that there
is reasonable doubt on the original charge) he will probably
use the weak points in the prosecution's case and any mitigating
factors to secure a non-trial disposition to a lesser charge, with
an indication or promise of a lenient sentence. For example, in
a case involving armed robbery charges against two defendants
(both of whom were released on their own recognizance), the
D.A. and two defense attorneys (a P.D. and a court-appointed
private attorney) agreed on a non-trial disposition to the lesser
charge of Grand Theft Person. They then talked to the judge
who promised the defendants a misdemeanor sentence, condi-
tioned upon a favorable probation report. The D.A. described
the case and explained his considerations in making the plea
bargain:
The defendants had no aggravated involvement with the law pre-
viously. One of them had only a few drunk arrests and a con-
viction of disorderly conduct, a minor thing. The other defendant
had one drunk driving, I think, and a possession of pills that had
been dismissed. He had served in the armed forces and received
an honorable discharge. He had been overseas and even got a
medal of some sort. They are both employed.
The deal was: They had been drinking heavily and were outside
a bar and stopped this guy. The victim said they pulled a gun
on him and demanded his money and so forth. They took his
wallet, keys, and something else-some change or a watch, I
think. They were caught just a few minutes later and all the
victim's belongings were in the defendants' car. But there was
no gun. Now robbers don't just throw away a gun if they had
one. I mean, this is something of value. And they were caught
immediately after the incident, so the evidence on the presence
of the gun is very weak. The victim had been drinking in that
bar all day long and was quite drunk, so he's not that much help.
And the defendants were drunk when they were arrested-one
had a .10 and the other a .18 blood alcohol reading. A person is
presumed to be drunk by law when the alcohol reading is .10.
So this case is not like when some fellows march into a liquor
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store with a gun and hold up the store. Or a robbery of a gas
station or a grocery store. I mean this is not a classic robbery..
case. It's probably more of a Grand Theft Person- just the
taking of money from a person. That's why a plea to Grand Theft
Person is very appropriate here. We look at the background of
the individuals, how much involvement they've had with the
law, and the circumstances of the case. (Emphasis added.)
An armed robbery charge is a mandatory felony with pun-
ishment of five years to life in state prison and, were the armed
allegation found true, the court would be restricted from grant-
ing probation; Grand Theft Person, on the other hand, is an
optional felony. Thus, although the defendants' backgrounds
would call for lenient sentencing, the risks of the trial were
considerable. The P.D. was uncertain whether to go for a trial
or not, commenting:
We were ready to try it. But it's really a "dogmeat" case. The
guys were drunk. It happened outside a bar .... This was a
damned good deal .... The risks of the trial were high.
In court, the defendants withdrew their pleas of not guilty and
pleaded guilty to Grand Theft Person (which was stipulated
by the D.A. to be "a lesser and necessarily included offense of
robbery"). The D.A. took the waivers and, for the record, ex-
plained to the defendants that:
Representations have been made by the court to you that, by
P.C. §17, the offense will be made a misdemeanor and handled
with a county level sentence. If the probation report is not favor-
able and the judge decides that he cannot do this, then you may
withdraw your plea of guilty.
Cases with high sentencing risks and reasonable doubt on
whether the defendant was involved in the crime present the
most difficult decisions for P.D.'s in the choice of disposition.
Frequently these cases rest on "eyewitness identification" of the
defendant by the victim (which P.D.'s consider "one of the
shakiest kinds of evidence, although people usually think it's
one of the strongest"). Alternative dispositions on these cases
are carefully considered - both the bargains possible in non-
trial disposition and the chances and consequences of trial dis-
position. The final decision may depend upon the P.D.'s evalua-
tion of the chances at trial, his willingness and/or ability to
encourage the defendant one way or the other, and the de-
fendant's vehemence in protesting his innocence.
In the following case, the defendant (in custody, with one
prior felony conviction) was charged with two counts of first
degree armed robbery and the case was resolved by jury trial.
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According to the D.A., a young couple were sitting in their car
one night when two men approached, one with a gun, and
ordered them to leave the car. The men drove off with the
car containing the woman's purse (which, admittedly, she had
forgotten when she left the car). The next morning, police
found the defendant, along with several others, stripping the
car. The others got away, but the defendant was caught and
charged with two counts of armed robery- Count 1 was the
theft of the man's car; Count 2 was the theft of the woman's
purse. The defendant clearly appeared guilty of stripping a
stolen car - a very different (and far lesser) offense than the
robbery charges. The P.D. described the case before the trial
as follows:
My guy is accused of robbery and the victims are, you know,
positive that he's the guy. But I've been talking to his sister-in-
law who will testify that he was at her house the whole night
that the robbery was to have occurred. And his brothers, who
look just like him, will be sitting in the front row. So the jury
can see them and wonder about the "positive identification."
During the trial the attorneys were still discussing alternatives
for a non-trial disposition. The D.A. had indicated earlier that:
We would have taken a. plea to second degree robbery with
county jail time-maybe six months. Or even to Grand Theft
Person .... But they didn't want' to plead. Smith is a tough P.D.
And then during a recess in the trial, the D.A. and P.D. were
overheard talking:
D.A.: ... Sure, we might go with Receiving Stolen Property.
That's clearly there.
P.D.: What about sentencing? I'm interested in a misdemeanor
sentence. Probation and County Jail suspended, maybe.
And that it be made a misdemeanor by Sec. 17....
D.A.: Let's talk to the judge and tell him what we're thinking....
In the judge's chambers, they briefly discussed sentencing
and then worked out the possible lesser offenses that would be
included in the instructions to the jury (and the jury trial
continued). In order to give the jury ample opportunity for
compromise, there were six different verdicts possible on each
count: Not Guilty, Guilty as charged of first degree robbery
or Guilty of second degree robbery, of Grand Theft Person, of
Simple Assault (a misdemeanor), or of Petty Theft (a mis-
demeanor). After 30 minutes of deliberations, the jury found
the defendant guilLy of first degree robbery as charged on
Count 1, and not guilty of Count 2.
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The P.D., needless to say, was quite disappointed, and he
announced that he would move for a new trial at the Probation
and Sentencing hearing.21 Later that afterno6n a colleague in
the P.D.'s office asked him, "How'd you do on that 'dog' you
took to trial?" The P.D. described the outcome of the robbery
case, adding that:
That case really bothers me-knowing that we could have had a
disposition (a non-trial disposition with some kind of bargain).
But the guy said he was innocent and he wanted a jury trial.
I could have come down harder on him though, if I thought
he didn't have a case at all. (Emphasis added.)
This last remark points to the importance of a P.D.'s own
evaluation of a case and his willingness to encourage his client
to accept that evaluation.
CONCLUSION
The major question investigated in this study was: What
determines whether a case will be settled by plea bargaining
or trial? Two factors were found to be crucial for choosing the
method of disposition: the strength of the prosecution's case
and the seriousness of the case, in terms of the probable pun-
ishment on conviction. A typology of cases was developed to
show how P.D.'s use these factors to predict case outcomes. The
P.D.'s then recommend adversary trial where the risks of trial
are low and the possible gains are high. This occurs principally
in three situations: (1) In a "light" case with "reasonable doubt"
that the defendant committed any crime. Here, the sentencing
risks of trial conviction are low, and the possible gain, com-
plete acquittal, is considerable (and is usually not obtainable
through bargaining). (2) In a "serious" case where there is
a good chance of conviction (either on the original charge or
on a lesser charge) and where a non-state prison sentence can-
not be obtained through bargaining. Here, the sentencing risks
are low since the defendant goes to prison whether by trial
conviction or by plea; the possible gain is acquittal which means
complete avoidance of punishment. (3) In a "serious" case where
there is "reasonable doubt" that the defendant was involved
in the crime. Here, trial may or may not be chosen since the
risks are high, but so are the possible gains.
It should be noted that most of the cases were perceived by
P.D.'s to be "dead bang" or "reasonable doubt" on the original
charge with probable conviction on a lesser charge. As one P.D.
commented: "Most of the cases we get are pretty hopeless-really
not much chance of an acquittal." Further, most of the cases were
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perceived to be "light" as seen, for example, by the fact that 70%
of convicted defendants were sentenced to probation and 59%
were convicted at the misdemeanor level. Thus, the "light, dead
bang" cases were most frequent and the "serious, reasonable
doubt" cases were least frequent.
Some additional evidence of the importance of the seriousness
of a case for determining the method of disposition comes from an
examination of statistical data on all case dispositions. Recall
that a "serious" case is one with a high chance of a state prison
sentence-i.e., a case involving a severe offense (such as a
mandatory felony) or one in which the defendant has a bad
criminal record. Table 2 shows the relationship between the type
of disposition and the charged offense. A rank ordering of trial
disposition by offense type (Table 3) reveals that cases involving
the most severe crimes were more likely to be resolved by trial
processes than were the lighter offenses. For example, while
11.6% of the total felony dispositions were resolved by adversary
trial, 36.1% of the homicides, 28% of the kidnappings, and 27.1%
of the forcible rapes were settled by full court or jury trial, as
compared with only 8.6% of the drunk driving, 8.2% of the mari-
juana and dangerous drug cases, 6.2% of the forgeries and 5.0%
of the bookmaking cases.
In addition, an examination of disposition method by prior
record shows that 14.1% of the defendants with prison records had
their cases resolved by adversary trial, while 11.8% of defendants
with major records, 10.9% of defendants with minor records and
9.5% of defendants with no record had trial dispositions - again,
this is in comparison to 11.6% of all dispositions which were by
trial (Greenwood, et al., 1973: 42). While this data is not directly
applicable to this paper (since it includes all case dispositions-
those of P.D.'s and private attorneys), it does tend to corroborate
the pattern suggested here.
To what extent does the trial proceeding represent a failure
of bargaining? To a certain extent, it does: some "serious" cases
go to trial as a result of failure to reach a compromise agreement
on sentencing; others go to trial after a failure of bargaining be-
tween a P.D. and his client. However, in "light" cases with a good
chance of acquittal, there is usually no bargaining prior to trial
because P.D.'s accurately anticipate that most D.A's will not
agree to dismissal. This paper, however, suggests that the question
itself may be too simply phrased. A variety of "bargains" have
been identified, ranging from the implicit understanding charac-
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terizing the disposition of many "light" cases to the explicit
negotiations occurring with "serious" cases. Therefore, the concept
of plea "bargaining" needs to be examined more systematically in
order to distinguish among the different practices accompanying
non-trial dispositions.
What other factors determine the method of case disposition?
Clearly lawyer/client interaction should be investigated further,
since defendants sometimes choose trial disposition in spite of
their attorney's view of the risks involved. Also, on occasion,
caseload pressure on the D.A.'s forces them to agree to plea bar-
gains that would not ordinarily be approved, and thus a trial
disposition may be avoided. However, this factor is not predic-
table by P.D.'s and so cannot be a routine feature of disposition
strategy. Finally, ethnographic description gives a picture of a
process at a given point in time, without necessarily accounting
for changes in the process over time. Factors which may change
over time and affect decisions on disposition include: variation
in conviction rate by juries or judges; change in judges' sentenc-
ing behavior or their willingness to commit themselves to prob-
able sentences; organizational changes on how cases are assigned
to different judges or on the ease of obtaining transfers among
judges; change in D.A. policy on permissable charge reductions;
and changes in criminal law or procedure (by statute or by
appellate court decisions).
The trial proceeding does not resolve the conflict over what
is to be done with guilty offenders. It is the question of punish-
ment which underlies, in part, much of the dynamics of plea bar-
gaining. It is suggested, then, that proposals for reform of trial
court processes should consider more carefully the relationship
between what happens in court to what happens in prisons and
probation programs.
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TABLE 2: DISPOSITION OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT, BY OFFENSE CHARGED AND TYPE OF
DISPOSITION (1970). (B.C.S., n.d.)
Total Jury Trial Court Submitted on
Offense22 Defen- Trial the Transcript Guilty Dis-
dants Convic. Acquit. Convic. Acquit. Convic. Acquit. Plea missal
Homicide 398 74 17 36 17 59 21 147 27
Manslaughter,
Vehicular 69 3 - 4 - 12 3 45 2
Robbery 1875 136 55 154 71 411 59 881 108
Assault 1640 61 52 146 93 418 91 658 121
Burglary 4670 126 54 218 90 1304 82 2456 240
Theft,
Except Auto 2092 26 25 102 81 504 188 939 227
Theft, Auto 1582 19 14 60 55 432 119 791 92
Forgery
& Checks 2107 31 5 57 37 430 102 1371 74
Rape, Forcible 391 21 15 34 36 71 19 160 35
Other Sex
Offenses 769 40 26 53 57 216 33 296 48
Total Drug
Violation 13,824 198 68 603 363 3913 987 6141 1548
Opiates 1250 52 8 108 42 334 61 478 167
Marijuana 5529 51 36 193 170 1502 489 2293 795
Danger-
ous Drugs 6851 92 24 297 148 2023 428 3259 580
Other
Drug Violation 194 3 - 8 3 54 9 111 6
Deadly Weapons 377 3 1 23 13 105 32 156 44
Drunk Driving 371 9 1 20 2 93 7 231 8
Hit & Run 109 5 1 6 3 27 3 62 2
Escape 146 - - 2 2 18 4 118 2
Kidnapping 189 24 4 16 9 37 7 79 13
Bookmaking 701 3 1 17 14 166 69 374 57
Other 261 17 6 12 9 51 12 108 46
31,571 796 345 1566 952 8267 1938 15,013 2694Total
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Total 31,571 11.6% 8.0% 3.6%
NOTES
1 For example, see Blumberg (1967), Alschuler (1968), Downie (1972),
and Casper (1972). Feeley offers an interesting critique of Blumberg
on this point, suggesting that "Blumberg has somewhat overstated the
importance of heavy case loads" (Feeley, 1973: 418). For other analyses
of plea bargaining, see Miller (1927), Moley (1929), Vetri (1964), New-
man (1966), Skolnick (1967), and President's Commission (1967).
2 In 1927, Miller similarly noted that judicial participation in compromise
settlements of criminal cases had increased with the growth of probation.
He suggested: "It is hard to preserve a severe disinterestedness in the
desirability of compromise when the conditions which make probation
desirable appear early in the arraignment or before the case comes to
trial" (Miller, 1927: 10).
3 Defendants (particularly those in custody) do however share their own
knowledge and beliefs about the court and its processes. See, for example,
Spradley (1970) and Casper (1972).
4 This discussion owes much to Newman (1966), McIntyre and Lippman
(1970), and Levin (1970; 1971). Levin (1971: 207) first characterized the
"conventional image" of criminal court processes and showed that guilty
plea patterns for several urban courts "deviate quite significantly from
the monolithic image in the literature."
;,Feeley (1973: 417) notes that Blumberg's "Metropolitan Court" is that
of New York City. For other discussions of New York's criminal court,
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see Kuh (1966-67), Alschuler (1968) and White (1971); in particular,
compare Blumberg (1967) with White (1971) on the participation of
New York judges in plea bargaining.
0 Greenwood, et al. (1973) is the recently published report on felony pro-
secution in Los Angeles by the Rand Corporation. Its data provide an
interesting comparison with the discussion in this paper; the report is
particularly useful to compare the central district with the branch courts
in Los Angeles.
7The term "slow plea" seems to have originated in Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh, although it is used in other criminal courts. A "slow plea"
of guilty is a trial before a judge without a jury where "the defendant's
counsel facilitates the presentation of evidence and implicitly or ex-
plicitly admits that the defendant is guilty of some offense, but does not
enter a formal plea" (White, 1971: 439).
8 In all tables and references to felony dispositions, the unit of count is the
individual defendant, rather than the case. A single defendant may have
numerous complaints filed against him (resulting in a number of cases)
but still have ,only one disposition. See B.C.S. (1969: 101).
9For a comparison of cases of Public Defenders and private attorneys
in Los Angeles, see Smith and Wendel (1968).
10 In greater detail: 22.3% had "no known record of arrest or conviction";
33.8% had a minor record, "which indicates a range from at least one
known arrest through any number of convictions carrying sentences of
less than 90 days jail or up to one year probation"; 29.6% had a major
record, "indicating any number of convictions with sentences of at least
90 days jail or probation exceeding one year"; 14.3% had a prison re-
cord, "indicating at least one Federal cr State prison sentence." (Category
descriptions are from B.C.S., 1969: 111, and figures for 1970 are from
B.C.S., 1970: 22.)
11 In January, 1971, the court procedures changed so that defendants no
longer came to the Master Calendar Department for arraignment and
plea. Instead they were assigned directly to a trial department at the
conclusion of their preliminary hearing. Most of my research was com-
pleted before that time, so I will not deal here with the effects of that
organizational change.
12 Of all 9,927 felony complaints terminated in the lower courts in 1970
(for the entire county), about two-thirds were dismissed. Of the re-
maining third, most were reduced to misdemeanors by 17 of the Penal
Code (B.C.S., 1970: 8). For various reasons, there were very few re-
ductions at this point in the Central district; attorneys indicated that
reductions (usually from plea bargaining) were much more frequent
in the branch courts. The proportion of cases terminated in the lower
courts has been steadily increasing in Los Angeles, largely because of a
change in 17 of the Penal Code (in November, 1969), and then in 1971,
to changes in D.A. office policy and to a California Supreme Court
decision, Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (1971).
13 These figures and those to be cited henceforth are for felony dispositions
in the entire county, although descriptions given here are for the pro-
cesses of the Central district only. Complete statistical data was not avail-
able for the Central district, but where it was available, it indicated that
patterns in county-wide figures accurately reflected patterns in figures
for the Central district.
14 The disposition patterns are fairly consistent over time, although in 1971
there was a rather sharp increase in the percentage of guilty pleas and
a decline in the use of submission on the transcript (S.O.T.). Greenwood,
et al. (1973:38) report that, in 1971, 55.3% of defendants pleaded guilty
and only 25.0% were tried by S.O.T. This merits further investigation.
15 Examples of mandatory felonies are homicide, kidnapping, robbery, first
degree burglary, forcible rape, possession of heroin, sale of marijuana or
dangerous drugs. Examples of optional felonies are assault with a deadly
weapon, possession of marijuana or dangerous drugs, second degree
burglary, grand theft, forgery, bookmaking.
10 Most P.D.'s, having decided that a certain non-trial disposition was better
for their client than facing the risks of trial, would strongly urge the
client to accept the arranged disposition. But some P.D.'s would take a
great many cases to trial, explaining that they do "whatever a client
wants," instead of recommending "what's best for a client." This sub-
group of P.D.'s (which included 10-15 % of the attorneys in felony trials)
dserves closer study because they, in effect, refuse to play the game of
Mather / METHODS OF CASE DISPOSITION 215
making predictions and calculating the costs and benefits of trial. Their
cases are not included in the discussion which follows.
17 A complete analysis of the decision to plead should also examine the
defendant's viewpoint, to determine the factors on which his decision is
based. Such an analysis would consider, for example, pretrial custody
status, race, age and prior record of the defendant.
1 8 The name in this and all other quotes has been changed to preserve
anonymity.
II This is not entirely accurate. With some judges, attorneys would occa-
sionally chamberize even when they were in conflict.
20 On the surface, the data of Greenwood, et al. (1973: 42-43) (showing that
severity of sentence increases from guilty pleas and S.O.T.'s to trials)
contradict this. One prcblem with their discussion is that, even controlling
for charged offense and prior record (as they do), they assume that the
cases settled by trial are equivalent (for sentencing purposes) to the cases
settled by plea or S.O.T. This paper suggests, however, that sentencing
considerations have a definite effect on the choice cf disposition method.
21 After the trial, the judge indicated privately that he was disturbed that
the jury had only taken 30 minutes to reach their verdict. (Note that it
had taken the judge and attorneys longer than that to agree on all of
the various compromise verdicts.) When asked whether the finding of
first degree would mean an automatic state prison sentence for the de-
fendant, the judge indicated that it would, as he had virtually no
discretion available. Later, at the Probation and Sentence hearing, the
P.D.'s motion for a new trial was denied. However, the judge then
modified the verdict to find the defendant guilty of the lesser, but neces-
sarily included, offense of Grand Theft Person. He sentenced the de-
fendant (who was 19) to the California Youth Authority (C.Y.A.), a
correctional institution for persons less than 21 years of age. Since the
modified conviction was fcr an optional felony (Grand Theft Person),
a commitment to C.Y.A. made the offense a misdemeanor by sentence.
Hence, the final outcome of the case was better than the risks of trial
conviction had indicated. However, this outcome was considered unusual.
This judge was viewed by P.D.'s as being particularly fair and con-
scientious; most judges would not "second guess" a jury in this way.
22 Where more than one charge was filed against a defendant, "offense
charged" represents the most serious one.
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